Recent dual-process reasoning theories have explained the belief-bias effect, the tendency for human reasoning to be erroneously biased when logical conclusions are incongruent with beliefs about the world, by proposing a belief-based automatic heuristic system and logic-based demanding analytic system. Although these claims are supported by the behavioral finding that high-load secondary tasks enhance the belief-bias effect, the neural correlates of dual-task reasoning remain unknown. The present study therefore examined the relationship between dual-task effect and activity in the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) during belief-bias reasoning by near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS). Forty-eight subjects participated in this study (MA=23.46 years). They were required to perform congruent and incongruent reasoning trials while responding to high- and low-load secondary tasks. Behavioral analysis showed that the high-load secondary task impaired only incongruent reasoning performance. NIRS analysis found that the high-load secondary task decreased right IFC activity during incongruent trials. Correlation analysis showed that subjects with enhanced right IFC activity could perform better in the incongruent reasoning trials, though subjects for whom right IFC activity was impaired by the secondary task could not maintain better reasoning performance. These findings suggest that the right IFC may be responsible for the dual-task effect in conflicting reasoning processes. When secondary tasks impair right IFC activity, subjects may rely on the automatic heuristic system, which results in belief-bias responses. We therefore offer the first demonstration of neural correlates of dual-task effect on IFC activity in belief-bias reasoning.