Is it wrong to impose the harms of human life? A reply to Benatar

Theor Med Bioeth. 2010 Aug;31(4):317-31. doi: 10.1007/s11017-010-9152-y.

Abstract

Might it be morally wrong to procreate? David Benatar answers affirmatively in Better Never to Have Been, arguing that coming into existence is always a great harm. I counter this view in several ways. First, I argue against Benatar's asserted asymmetry between harm and benefit--which would support the claim that any amount of harm in a human life would make it not worth starting--while questioning the significance of his distinction between a life worth starting and one worth continuing. I further contend that his understanding of hedonism and desire-fulfillment theories distorts their implications for the quality of human life; as for objective-list theories, I rebut his critique of their human-centered basis of evaluation. Notwithstanding this multi-tiered challenge to Benatar's reasoning, I conclude with praise for his work and the intellectual virtues it embodies.

MeSH terms

  • Beginning of Human Life / ethics*
  • Ethical Analysis
  • Humans
  • Moral Obligations*
  • Philosophy
  • Quality of Life* / psychology
  • Reproduction / ethics*
  • Wrongful Life* / ethics