Integrated information theory (IIT) has established itself as one of the leading theories for the study of consciousness. IIT essentially proposes that quantitative consciousness is identical to maximally integrated conceptual information, quantified by a measure called Φmax, and that phenomenological experience corresponds to the associated set of maximally irreducible cause-effect repertoires of a physical system being in a certain state. With the current work, we provide a general formulation of the framework, which comprehensively and parsimoniously expresses Φmax in the language of probabilistic models. Here, the stochastic process describing a system under scrutiny corresponds to a first-order time-invariant Markov process, and all necessary mathematical operations for the definition of Φmax are fully specified by a system's joint probability distribution over two adjacent points in discrete time. We present a detailed constructive rule for the decomposition of a system into two disjoint subsystems based on flexible marginalization and factorization of this joint distribution. Furthermore, we show that for a given joint distribution, virtualization is identical to a flexible factorization enforcing independence between variable subsets. We then validate our formulation in a previously established discrete example system, in which we also illustrate the previously unexplored theoretical issue of quale underdetermination due to non-unique maximally irreducible cause-effect repertoires. Moreover, we show that the current definition of Φ entails its sensitivity to the shape of the conceptual structure in qualia space, thus tying together IIT's measures of quantitative and qualitative consciousness, which we suggest be better disentangled. We propose several modifications of the framework in order to address some of these issues.
Keywords: computational modelling; consciousness; integrated information; qualia; theories and models.