Patients facing catastrophic illness often desire choice when selecting specialist physicians and will sometimes request specialists at academic medical centers (AMCs). Under capitated payment systems, community primary care physician (PCP) gatekeepers have an incentive to refer patients to local specialists with whom they regularly collaborate rather than to AMC specialists, who generally are more expensive and with whom they may not have working relationships. As a result of the financial pressures of capitation and the desire to work with familiar specialists, some PCPs in community-based risk-sharing groups are reluctant to refer sick patients in capitated health plans to AMC-affiliated specialists. Forced to choose between their existing primary care relationships and their desired specialists, some patients are terminating their existing primary care relationships to enroll with PCPs affiliated with the AMCs to which they wish to be referred. The authors' observations at their AMC indicate that most of the patients leaving their PCPs in the community do so to gain access to oncology and surgical specialty services. The shifting of sick patients in capitated health plans to AMC-affiliated PCPs creates a financial burden for both AMCs and their affiliated physicians. Health plans and AMCs must cooperate in developing a solution; for example, risk-adjust each risk unit's capitation payment based on the health status and disease burden of its population. The authors propose strategies aimed at enabling patients to have access to AMC tertiary care services while ensuring that the cost of caring for the sickest patients is not borne solely by AMC risk groups. They conclude that it is in the best interests of all concerned to modify the current counterproductive incentives that promote the problems they have described.