Why do beliefs about intelligence influence learning success? A social cognitive neuroscience model

Abstract

Students' beliefs and goals can powerfully influence their learning success. Those who believe intelligence is a fixed entity (entity theorists) tend to emphasize 'performance goals,' leaving them vulnerable to negative feedback and likely to disengage from challenging learning opportunities. In contrast, students who believe intelligence is malleable (incremental theorists) tend to emphasize 'learning goals' and rebound better from occasional failures. Guided by cognitive neuroscience models of top-down, goal-directed behavior, we use event-related potentials (ERPs) to understand how these beliefs influence attention to information associated with successful error correction. Focusing on waveforms associated with conflict detection and error correction in a test of general knowledge, we found evidence indicating that entity theorists oriented differently toward negative performance feedback, as indicated by an enhanced anterior frontal P3 that was also positively correlated with concerns about proving ability relative to others. Yet, following negative feedback, entity theorists demonstrated less sustained memory-related activity (left temporal negativity) to corrective information, suggesting reduced effortful conceptual encoding of this material-a strategic approach that may have contributed to their reduced error correction on a subsequent surprise retest. These results suggest that beliefs can influence learning success through top-down biasing of attention and conceptual processing toward goal-congruent information.

Fig. 1

Proportion of errors of each confidence type (omits, lower confidence, higher confidence) that were corrected at retest, as a function of theory of intelligence (entity, incremental). Error bars in this and all subsequent figures represent the standard error of the mean (SEM).

Fig. 2

ERPs to negative and positive performance-relevant feedback. (A) Grand mean averaged waveforms of entity and incremental theorists to negative feedback (feedback following errors) as a function of the participant's confidence that his/her answer was correct (lower, higher), shown at FCz, where effects of expectation were maximal. Waveforms in this and all subsequent figures were low-pass filtered at 15 Hz. The zero point in the timeline marks the feedback onset. Positive is plotted up. (B) Scalp topography of the difference between high and low confidence errors (i.e. the expectancy effect), collapsed over group. Top–down view with nose pointed toward the top of the page. (C) Same grand mean average waveforms as in (A), but shown at Fz, where effects of theory of intelligence (TOI) were more prominent. (D) Scalp topography of the difference between the entity and incremental responses to the negative feedback at 380 ms (peak of the P3), collapsed over confidence (weighted average). (E–F) Same as in (A–B), except for positive feedback. (G–H) Same as in (C–D), except for positive feedback.

Fig. 3

The feedback-locked negativity (FRN). (A) Difference waveforms associated with negative feedback to unexpected errors (HCE − LCC) and expected errors (LCE − HCC) for entity and incremental theorists. The black arrow points to the part of the waveform corresponding to the peak of the negativity in the raw waveforms (300 ms; see Figure 2C and G). (B) Scalp topography of the FRN difference wave at its peak latency, collapsed across group and expectancy.

Fig. 4

ERPs to learning-relevant feedback. Grand mean waveforms at temporal sites as a function of theory of intelligence (entity, incremental) and subsequent memory performance (corrected, not corrected).

Fig. 5

(A) Scalp topography illustrating the left and right hemisphere Dm effects (difference of later corrected vs. later not corrected) at 750 ms, collapsed over group. (B) Regional distribution of the Dm effect from 500–1000 ms (collapsed over group). Regions with significant memory-related differences are noted with asterisks. (C) Mean activity for entity and incremental groups in regions were memory-related differences were found in (B). Significant TOI differences (collapsed over subsequent memory) are noted with asterisks.