Empirical ethics and its alleged meta-ethical fallacies

Bioethics. 2009 May;23(4):193-201. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01710.x.

Abstract

This paper analyses the concept of empirical ethics as well as three meta-ethical fallacies that empirical ethics is said to face: the is-ought problem, the naturalistic fallacy and violation of the fact-value distinction. Moreover, it answers the question of whether empirical ethics (necessarily) commits these three basic meta-ethical fallacies.

Publication types

  • Review

MeSH terms

  • Bias
  • Empirical Research*
  • Empiricism
  • Ethical Analysis*
  • Ethical Relativism*
  • Ethical Theory*
  • Ethics, Medical*
  • Humans
  • Logic
  • Morals
  • Principle-Based Ethics