Dual Processes in Decision Making and Developmental Neuroscience: A Fuzzy-Trace Model

Abstract

From Piaget to the present, traditional and dual-process theories have predicted improvement in reasoning from childhood to adulthood, and improvement has been observed. However, developmental reversals-that reasoning biases emerge with development -have also been observed in a growing list of paradigms. We explain how fuzzy-trace theory predicts both improvement and developmental reversals in reasoning and decision making. Drawing on research on logical and quantitative reasoning, as well as on risky decision making in the laboratory and in life, we illustrate how the same small set of theoretical principles apply to typical neurodevelopment, encompassing childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, and to neurological conditions such as autism and Alzheimer's disease. For example, framing effects-that risk preferences shift when the same decisions are phrases in terms of gains versus losses-emerge in early adolescence as gist-based intuition develops. In autistic individuals, who rely less on gist-based intuition and more on verbatim-based analysis, framing biases are attenuated (i.e., they outperform typically developing control subjects). In adults, simple manipulations based on fuzzy-trace theory can make framing effects appear and disappear depending on whether gist-based intuition or verbatim-based analysis is induced. These theoretical principles are summarized and integrated in a new mathematical model that specifies how dual modes of reasoning combine to produce predictable variability in performance. In particular, we show how the most popular and extensively studied model of decision making-prospect theory-can be derived from fuzzy-trace theory by combining analytical (verbatim-based) and intuitive (gist-based) processes.

Figure 1

Children were presented with sentences as part of 12 short narratives (The bird is in the cage. The cage is under the table. The bird has yellow feathers; Brainerd & Mojardin, 1998). After a buffer task, they were given recognition tests; they were instructed to only say “yes” to exact matches of presented sentences. The “gist” measure refers to false alarms (saying “yes” to paraphrases of presented sentences, such as The cage is below the table).

Figure 2

Sixty money and lives framing problems (30 gain and 30 loss) were presented within subjects to 38 adults. Two sets of materials were constructed; subjects saw the gains problems from one set and the loss problems from the other set. The mixed versions were the traditional complete framing problems as they are typically presented. The gist versions juxtaposed the zero complement of the gamble (e.g., 2/3 probability that no one will saved) and the sure thing (e.g., 200 saved for sure), whereas the verbatim versions juxtaposed the non-zero complement (e.g., 1/3 probability that 600 will be saved) and the sure thing (e.g., 200 saved for sure). Non-focal complements were presented as part of the preamble to each problem, eliminating ambiguity.

Figure 3

Summary of gist and verbatim memory abilities in typical and atypical development across the life span. Children are positioned higher in verbatim memory than those with Alzheimer's disease. Adolescents are positioned higher in verbatim memory than children and those with Alzheimer's, but lower in gist memory than younger adults and older adults (aged). Memory abilities constrain processing styles. Therefore, younger adults have the greatest cognitive flexibility.

Figure 4

Illustrating different probabilities of transitioning from the some-none state to the some-more state for the discrete (gist) process, which produce the prospect theory value function for gains and losses. As shown in the figure, higher values of theta approach linearity, the verbatim process.