Eliciting health care priorities in developing countries: experimental evidence from Guatemala

Abstract

Although some methods for eliciting preferences to assist participatory priority setting in health care in developed countries are available, the same is not true for poor communities in developing countries whose preferences are neglected in health policy making. Existing methods grounded on self-interested, monetary valuations that may be inappropriate for developing country settings where community care is provided through 'social allocation' mechanisms. This paper proposes and examines an alternative methodology for eliciting preferences for health care programmes specifically catered for rural and less literate populations but which is still applicable in urban communities. Specifically, the method simulates a realistic collective budget allocation experiment, to be implemented in both rural and urban communities in Guatemala. We report evidence revealing that participatory budget-like experiments are incentive compatible mechanisms suitable for revealing collective preferences, while simultaneously having the advantage of involving communities in health care reform processes.

Keywords: Developing countries; health care reform; preference elicitation; priority setting; willingness to assign; willingness to pay.