How is working memory content consciously experienced? The 'conscious copy' model of WM introspection

Abstract

We address the issue of how visual information stored in working memory (WM) is introspected. In other words, how do we become aware of WM content in order to consciously examine or manipulate it? Influential models of WM have suggested that WM representations are either conscious by definition, or directly accessible for conscious inspection. We propose that WM introspection does not operate on the actual memory trace but rather requires a new representation to be created for the conscious domain. This conscious representation exists in addition and in parallel to the actual memory representation. The existence of such a separate representation is revealed by and reflected in the qualitatively different functional characteristics between the actual memory trace and its conscious experience, and their distinct interactions within external visual input. Our model differs from state-based models in that WM introspection does not involve a change in the state of WM content, but rather involves the creation of a new, second representation existing in parallel to the original memory trace.

Keywords: Consciousness; Introspection; Mental imagery; Visual short-term memory; Working memory.