Nonbinding Legal Instruments in Governance for Global Health: Lessons from the Global AIDS Reporting Mechanism

J Law Med Ethics. Spring 2014;42(1):72-87. doi: 10.1111/jlme.12120.

Abstract

Recent debate over World Health Organization reform has included unprecedented attention to international lawmaking as a future priority function of the Organization. However, the debate is largely focused on the codification of new binding legal instruments. Drawing upon lessons from the success of the Global AIDS Reporting Mechanism, established pursuant to the United Nations' Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, we argue that effective global health governance requires consideration of a broad range of instruments, both binding and nonbinding. A detailed examination of the Global AIDS Reporting Mechanism reveals that the choice of the nonbinding format makes an important contribution to its effectiveness. For instance, the flexibility and adaptability of the nonbinding format have allowed the global community to: (1) undertake commitments in a timely manner; (2) adapt and experiment in the face of a dynamic pandemic; and (3) grant civil society an unparalleled role in monitoring and reporting on state implementation of global commitments. UNAIDS' institutional support has also played a vital role in ensuring the continuing effectiveness of the Global AIDS Reporting Mechanism. Overall, the experience of the Global AIDS Reporting Mechanism evidences that, at times, nimbler nonbinding instruments can offer benefits over slower, more rigid binding legal approaches to governance, but depend critically, like all instruments, on the perceived legitimacy thereof.

MeSH terms

  • Global Health / legislation & jurisprudence*
  • HIV Infections*
  • Health Policy / legislation & jurisprudence*
  • Humans
  • International Cooperation
  • Mandatory Reporting
  • World Health Organization / organization & administration*