Truth Telling, Companionship, and Witness: An Agenda for Narrative Ethics

Hastings Cent Rep. 2016 May;46(3):17-21. doi: 10.1002/hast.591.

Abstract

Narrative ethics holds that if you ask someone what goodness is, as a basis of action, most people will first appeal to various abstractions, each of which can be defined only by other abstractions that in turn require further definition. If you persist in asking what each of these abstractions actually means, eventually that person will have to tell you a story and expect you to recognize goodness in the story. Goodness and badness need stories to make them thinkable and to translate them into individual and collective actions. Yet after more than two decades of considering the issue, I do not believe that a collection of stories can by itself guide actions in ways that are sufficient to respond to ethical troubles in institutional settings. The question will always remain open for me, but my present belief is that narrative bioethics is always hyphenated, in the sense that guidance from stories needs to be allied with other ethical guidance. Each side of the hyphen qualifies the other side. The hyphenation I will argue for in this essay is "narrative-deontology."

MeSH terms

  • Bioethical Issues
  • Bioethics*
  • Humans
  • Morals
  • Narration*
  • Social Values*
  • Stress, Psychological / psychology
  • Terminal Care