Cesarean section and the manipulation of exact delivery time

Abstract

Physicians are often alleged responsible for the manipulation of delivery timing. We investigate this issue in a setting that negates the influence of financial incentives on physician's behavior. Working on a sample of women admitted at the onset of labor in a big public hospital in Italy we estimate a model for the exact time of delivery as driven by individual Indication to Cesarean Section (ICS) and covariates. We find that ICS does not affect the day of delivery but leads to a circadian rhythm in the likelihood of delivery. The pattern is consistent with the postponement of high ICS deliveries in the late night\early morning shift. Our evidence hardly supports the manipulation of timing of births as driven by medical staff's "demand for leisure". Physicians seem to manipulate the exact timing of delivery to reduce exposure to risk factors extant during off-peak periods.

Keywords: Cesarean section; Physician incentives; Scheduling; Timing of delivery.