Although frequent fluctuations in domestic hog prices seriously affect the stability and robustness of the hog supply chain, hog futures (an effective hedging instrument) have not been listed in China. To better understand hog futures market hedging, it is important to study the steady state of intersubjective bidding. This paper uses evolutionary game theory to construct a game model between hedgers and speculators in the hog futures market, and replicator dynamic equations are then used to obtain the steady state between the two trading entities. The results show that the steady state is one in which hedgers adopt a "buy" strategy and speculators adopt a "do not speculate" strategy, but this type of extreme steady state is not easily realized. Thus, to explore the rational proportion of hedgers and speculators in the evolutionary stabilization strategy, bidding processes were simulated using weekly average hog prices from 2006 to 2015, such that the conditions under which hedgers and speculators achieve a steady state could be analyzed. This task was performed to achieve the stability critical point, and we show that only when the value of λ is satisfied and the conditions of hog futures price changes and futures price are satisfied can hedgers and speculators achieve a rational proportion and a stable hog futures market. This market can thus provide a valuable reference for the development of the Chinese hog futures market and the formulation and guidance of relevant departmental policies.