From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind

Abstract

Predictive processing (PP) approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of how to position predictive processing with respect to enactive and embodied cognition has become a topic of intense debate. While these arguments are certainly of valuable scientific and philosophical merit, they risk underestimating the variety of approaches gathered under the predictive label. Here, we first present a basic review of neuroscientific, cognitive, and philosophical approaches to PP, to illustrate how these range from solidly cognitivist applications-with a firm commitment to modular, internalistic mental representation-to more moderate views emphasizing the importance of 'body-representations', and finally to those which fit comfortably with radically enactive, embodied, and dynamic theories of mind. Any nascent predictive processing theory (e.g., of attention or consciousness) must take into account this continuum of views, and associated theoretical commitments. As a final point, we illustrate how the Free Energy Principle (FEP) attempts to dissolve tension between internalist and externalist accounts of cognition, by providing a formal synthetic account of how internal 'representations' arise from autopoietic self-organization. The FEP thus furnishes empirically productive process theories (e.g., predictive processing) by which to guide discovery through the formal modelling of the embodied mind.

Keywords: Active inference; Computationalism; Connectionism; Embodied cognition; Enactivism; Interoception; Predictive processing.

Fig. 1

An early comparator-based predictive coding model of motor control, in which a forward model of expected sensory consequences is compared with the intended consequences of an action. The result discrepancy (‘Motor Error’) is then used to refine motor commands. Adapted from Miall and Wolpert (1996)

Fig. 2

The comparator model of sense of agency, in which discrete modules compute motor, intentional, and self-related prediction errors. The central monitoring of these signals is then thought to underlie the overall sense of agency for thought and action. Adapted from Synofzik et al. (2008)

Fig. 3

Depiction of the global, centrifugal predictive hierarchy according to radical predictive processing. Individual sub-components are distinguished by a feed-forward specialization as determined by the statistics of sensory inputs. Lateral connections and global precision-carrying signals (e.g., dopamine, norepinephrine, highlighted in red) link the network into a ‘centrifugal’ hierarchy with ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ layers. In some cases the ‘inner layer’ may be described as a global or self-model, which predicts the internal (visceral and neural) dynamics of the organism (adapted from Friston 2005). (Color figure online)

Fig. 4

The interoceptive predictive coding model. An interoceptive and motor comparator integrating visceral and agentic signals, respectively, are combined together to produce an overall feeling of conscious agency and presence. The presence comparator is proposed to be within the insular cortex, and is also argued to underlie ‘emotional inference’. Adapted from (Seth et al. 2012)