Objective: Reliable, valid, and precise measures of perceived cognitive functioning are useful in clinical practice and research. We present normative data, internal consistency statistics, item-level symptom endorsement, and the base rates of symptoms endorsed for the PROMIS® v2.0 Cognitive Function-Short Forms.
Method: The four-, six -, and eight-item short form of the PROMIS® v2.0 Cognitive Function scale assess subjective cognitive functioning. We stratified the normative sample from the U.S. general population (n = 1,009; 51.1% women) by gender, education, health status, self-reported history of a depression or anxiety diagnosis, and recent mental health symptoms (i.e., feeling anxious or depressed in the past week) and examined cognitive symptom reporting.
Results: Internal consistency was measured using Cronbach's alpha and ranged from .85 to .95 for all three forms, across all groups. Mann-Whitney U test comparisons showed that individuals with past or present mental health difficulties scored significantly lower (i.e., worse perceived cognitive functioning) on the self-report questionnaires, particularly the eight-item form (history of depression, men: p < .001, Cohen's d = 1.07; women: p < .001, d = .99; history of anxiety, men: p < .001, d = 1.06; women: p < .001, d = .98; and current mental health symptoms, men: p < .001, d = 1.38; women: p < .001, d = 1.19).
Conclusions: All three short forms of the PROMIS® v2.0 Cognitive Function scale had strong internal consistency reliability, supporting its use as a reliable measure of subjective cognitive functioning. The subgroup differences in perceived cognitive functioning supported the relationship between emotional and cognitive well-being. This study is the first to present normative values and base rates for several community-dwelling subgroups, allowing for precise interpretation of these measures in clinical practice and research.
Keywords: Anxiety; Assessment; Depression; Norms/normative studies; Test construction.
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