Autobiographical memory for deceitful events is said to be forgotten over time to reduce guilt and stress. People who engage in deceitful behavior continue to do so because they are able to stretch their memories to match their moral outlook. In this study, the authors wanted to see if participants who engage in deceitful behavior will change their behavior if they are reminded of their previous misdeeds and compare it with reminding them of past moral behavior and any neutral event. We also studied how the experience, or phenomenology of remembering, differs between immoral and moral memories. In Experiment 1, we found evidence to suggest that reminding deceptive autobiographical memory does not reduce deceptive behavior. In Experiment 2, we found evidence to suggest phenomenological characteristics of Immoral and moral memories are not significantly different from each other but they are both significantly different from that of neutral memory. This contradicts established results in the field. It is interesting to note that only emotional valence is significantly different between immoral and moral memory.
Keywords: Autobiographical memory; behaviour; deception; emotional valence.