Loose knots: Strong versus weak commitments to save for education in Uganda

J Dev Econ. 2025 May:174:103444. doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103444.

Abstract

Commitment devices offer an opportunity to restrict future choices. However, strict commitments may deter participation. Using a school-based commitment savings program for children to save for educational expenses in Uganda, we compare an account fully committed to school expenses to an account with a weaker commitment (funds withdrawn in cash, rather than a voucher). Children save more in the weaker commitment treatment arm, and when combined with parental outreach spend more on educational supplies and score 0.10 standard deviations (standard error = 0.04) on test scores. The fully committed account yields no such educational improvements, and neither account finds impacts on secondary or downstream outcomes such as attendance, enrollment, or non-cognitive skills.

Keywords: Commitment savings; Educational resources; Micro-savings; School participation.