Socrates (in the Meno) denied that virtues like courage could be taught, whereas Protagoras defended this claim. Compassion is discussed below in this context; it is distinguished from related, but different, moral qualities, and the role of imagination is emphasised. 'Sympathy's and role-modelling views of compassion's acquisition are criticised. Compassion can indeed be taught, but neither by the example of a few, isolated physicians nor by creation of Departments of Compassion. In replying to one standard objection to teaching compassion, it is emphasised that scientific competence and compassion aren't mutually exclusive.
KIE: Continuing the argument begun by Socrates and Protagoras over whether virtues can be taught, Pence asks if compassion can be taught in medical education. He distinguishes between this moral virtue and others such as pity and concern for social justice, then discusses the role imagination plays in compassion. Critical of historical and contemporary attitudes toward teaching compassion, he finds himself in agreement with the Protagoran view that moral ideals are developed within a social network. He concludes that current systems of medical education must be changed to avoid undermining existing compassion in students, and perhaps to support it.