Certainty, probability and abduction: why we should look to C.S. Peirce rather than Gödel for a theory of clinical reasoning

J Eval Clin Pract. 1997 Aug;3(3):201-6. doi: 10.1046/j.1365-2753.1997.00004.x.


This paper argues that Gödel's proof does not provide the appropriate conceptual basis on which to counter the claims of evidence-based medicine. The nature of, and differences between, deductive, inductive and abductive inference are briefly surveyed. The work of the American logician C.S. Peirce is introduced as a possible framework for a theory of clinical reasoning which can ground the claims of both evidence-based medicine and its critics.

Publication types

  • Comment

MeSH terms

  • Evidence-Based Medicine / methods*
  • Logic*
  • Models, Statistical*
  • Philosophy