Partial-birth abortion bans patterned after the federal bill passed by both houses of Congress are constitutional. The clear legislative definition can be easily distinguished from other abortion procedures. Abortion precedents do not apply to such bans because the abortion right pertains to unborn human beings, not to those partially delivered. Such bans are also rationally-related to legitimate state interests. Even if abortion jurisprudence is deemed to apply in the partial-birth abortion context, a ban is still constitutional under Casey because a ban on partial-birth abortions does not impose an undue burden on the abortion right.
PIP: This article addresses the vague and overly broad issues concerning partial-birth abortion bans and sets forth the arguments for the constitutionality of a ban patterned after the federal model, using the Michigan case as the example. It also addresses the constitutional issues not covered by the Michigan court in order to show that the federal model passes constitutional muster. The clear legislative definition can be easily distinguished from other abortion procedures. Abortion precedents do not apply to such bans because abortion rights pertain to unborn human beings rather than to those that are partially delivered. Furthermore, such bans are rationally related to the legitimate state interest in protecting life during parturition. Even if abortion jurisprudence is deemed to apply in the partial-birth context, a federal style ban is still constitutional under Casey because a ban on partial-birth abortions does not impose an undue burden on abortion rights. Thus, the partial-birth abortion debate is the defining moment in the abortion debate, and the resulting litigation is the final frontier of abortion jurisprudence.