The promises and perils of populism for democratic policymaking: the case of Mexico

Much has been said theoretically about whether populism corrects the limitations of democracies, or instead damages their foundations. Yet we still know very little about how populist governments affect democratic policymaking in practice. Taking the classic policy cycle approach as a heuristic device, this article analyzes how populists influence agenda-setting, policy formulation and design, implementation, evaluation, and termination processes. Using a variety of sources, the article provides a qualitative in-depth analysis of the Mexican case during the first half of president Andrés-Manuel López-Obrador administration. The article shows that a populist government may fulfill some of its promises, but it ultimately materializes most of its perils, causing significant policy, institutional, and social damage. Populists introduce important distortions in each one of the policy stages and thus alter considerably the policymaking processes usually associated with democratic regimes. They employ a variety of strategies to limit the number of policy actors taking part in agenda-setting and evaluation exercises; formulate ineffective policy tools based on questionable design assumptions; develop personalistic implementation channels prone to patronage and clientelism; undermine the value of evidence-based analyses and discussions; and terminate institutions and programs on a discretionary basis. By exerting a rhetorical monopoly over the 'will of the people,' populists can follow policymaking patterns that significantly depart from the technical, rational, and pluralistic standards commonly associated with democratic policymaking. The article brings together debates on populism and policymaking, and studies a national case which has received limited scholarly attention, thus adding to both our theoretical and empirical contemporary understanding on this subject.