Much of human thought, feeling, and behavior unfolds automatically. Indirect measures of cognition capture such processes by observing responding under corresponding conditions (e.g., lack of intention or control). The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is one such measure. The IAT indexes the strength of association between categories such as "planes" and "trains" and attributes such as "fast" and "slow" by comparing response latencies across two sorting tasks (planes-fast/trains-slow vs. trains-fast/planes-slow). Relying on a reanalysis of multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) studies, Schimmack (this issue, p. 396) argues that the IAT and direct measures of cognition, for example, Likert scales, can serve as indicators of the same latent construct, thereby purportedly undermining the validity of the IAT as a measure of individual differences in automatic cognition. Here we note the compatibility of Schimmack's empirical findings with a range of existing theoretical perspectives and the importance of considering evidence beyond MTMM approaches to establishing construct validity. Depending on the nature of the study, different standards of validity may apply to each use of the IAT; however, the evidence presented by Schimmack is easily reconcilable with the potential of the IAT to serve as a valid measure of automatic processes in human cognition, including in individual-difference contexts.
Keywords: Implicit Association Test; attitudes; implicit cognition; validity.