The presence of ex-ante moral hazard could undermine the potential gain from expanding health insurance coverage in developing nations. To test the proposition, this study utilizes a nationally representative longitudinal survey with Indonesia's health insurance for poor policy in 2014 as the quasi-experimental case study. The country represents developing nations that undergo a massive and rapid expansion of health insurance coverage. The empirical approach combines a matching and difference-in-differences method to obviate potential bias of the selectivity nature of health insurance provision and time-invariant unobserved factors. The findings suggest the presence of ex-ante moral hazard in the form of the less people using trash cans associated with the introduction of the subsidized health insurance premium. The results add empirical findings of a negative side effect of expanding health insurance coverage in developing nations.
Copyright: © 2022 Gitaharie et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.